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Morseburg v. Balyon-The High
Court Grants Royalty A Reprieve:
Constitutional Challenges to the
California Resale Royalties Act
By BOB JONES*
In June 1977, Beverly Hills art dealer Henry Morseburg' filed a
declaratory judgment action in the federal district court in Los An-
geles' in which he sought to have the California Resale Royalties
Acts declared unconstitutional on grounds it conflicted with federal
* Fellow, General Counsel's Office of the National Endowment for the Arts, Washington,
D.C.; Member, Artists Equity Association, Inc., Washington, D.C.; Member, State Bar of
California; A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of California at Davis.
The author wishes to thank Artists Equity Association, Inc. for assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
1. Morseburg brought the action with the financial backing of some California art dealers
and a handful of wealthy collectors who organized under the name CADRE (Collectors, Art-
ists and Dealers for Responsible Equity). See Canter, Why Artists Still Can't Collect Roy-
alties, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 5.
2. Morseburg v. Balyon, (1978] 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 518 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 23, 1978).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (Deering Supp., 1981). The statute provides:
(a) Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in California or the
sale takes place in California, the seller or his agent shall pay to the artist of such
work of fine art or to such artist's agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale. The
right of the artist to receive an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of such
sale is not transferable and may be waived only by a contract in writing providing
for an amount in excess of 5 percent of the amount of such sale.
(1) When a work of art is sold at an auction or by a gallery, dealer, broker, mu-
seum, or other person acting as the agent for the seller the agent shall withhold 5
percent of the amount of the sale, locate the artist and pay the artist.
(2) If the seller or agent is unable to locate and pay the artist within 90 days, an
amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of the sale shall be transferred to the
Arts Council.
(3) If a seller or his agent fails to pay an artist the amount equal to 5 percent of
the sale of a work of fine art by the artist or fails to transfer such amount to the
Arts Council, the artist may bring an action for damages within three years after
the date of sale or one year after the discovery of the sale, whichever is longer.
(4) Moneys received by the council pursuant to this section shall be deposited in
an account in the Special Deposit Fund in the State Treasury.
(5) The Arts Council shall attempt to locate any artist for whom money is received
pursuant to this section. If the council is unable to locate the artist and the artist
1
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copyright law4  and violated protected property' and contract
rights.6 Morseburg further requested a declaration stating that he
need not pay royalties to two artists whose work he sold in 1977.'
s The district court and the court of appeals rejected his arguments.'
Three years after suit was filed, the United States Supreme Court
does not file a written claim for the money received by the council within seven
years of the date of sale of the work of fine art, the right of the artist terminates
and such money shall be transferred to the operating fund of the council as reim-
bursement to fund programs of the council.
(6) Any amounts of money held by any seller or agent for the payment of artists
pursuant to this section shall be exempt from attachment or execution of judg-
ment by the creditors of such seller or agent.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to any of the following:
(1) To the initial sale of a work of fine art where legal title to such work at the
time of such initial sale is vested in the artist thereof.
(2) To the resale of a work of fine art for a gross sales price of less than one
thousand dollars ($1,000).
(3) To a resale after the death of such artist.
(4) To the resale of the work of fine art for a gross sales price less than the
purchase price paid by the seller.
(5) To a transfer of a work of fine art which is exchanged for one or more works of
fine art or for a combination of cash, other property, and one or more works of
fine art where the fair market value of the property exchanged is less than one
thousand dollars ($1,000).
(c) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) "Artist" means the person who creates a work of fine art.
2) "Fine art" means an original painting, sculpture, or drawing.
(d) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1977, and shall apply to
works of fine art created before and after its operative date.
(e) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid for any reason, such invalidity shall not affect any
other provisions or applications of this section which can be effected, without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are
severable.
4. See text accompanying notes 20-58, infra. Morseburg claimed the Resale Royalties Act
was preempted by the 1909 Copyright Act (Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)) and consequently
the California Act violated the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, 201 U.S.P.Q. at
219-20.
5. See text accompanying notes 124-40, infra. Morseburg claimed the California Act de-
prived him of his property without due process of law, thereby violating the 14th Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution.
6. See text accompanying notes 93-123, infra.
7. Morseburg sold a painting by Andre Balyon in California on March 25, 1977, at a gross
profit, for $1,400. On that same day, Morseburg sold a painting by an artist identified as
Antoine Blanchard at a gross profit, for $1,200. Both sales came within the coverage of the
Resale Royalties Act, CAL. Cv. CODE § 986. Antoine Blanchard was allegedly a pseudonym
for an artist living somewhere in France. Since Morseburg was unable to locate the artist,
the royalty was to be paid to the California Arts Council, pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE §
986(a) (2).
8. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 101 S.Ct. 399 (1980).
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dismissed the constitutional challenge without comment.'
Proponents of the California law view the Morseburg decision as
a. victory for artists and a vindication of the resale royalties con-
cept.10 The Ninth Circuit's decision may finally convince skeptical
state legislatures to pass legislation based upon the "constitution-
ally sound" California model." Richard Mayer, a San Francisco
sculptor and defendant in intervention in the Morseburg case,"
commenting upon the high court's dismissal of Morseburg's writ of
certiorari, stated:
This victory represents one more significant step toward in-
creased parity for artists in the art marketplace. While enactment
of a national resale royalty act may be an even more remote pos-
sibility, the prospects for more resale legislation on the state level
have increased. I know many states were closely following this
challenge. 8
9. Morseburg v. Balyon, No. 80-411, Petition for Writ of Certiorari (filed Sept. 15, 1980),
denied Nov. 10, 1980; 101 S.Ct. 399 (1980).
10. See Glueck, Royalties on Art Resales Are Far from Universal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1980, § C at 25, col. 5.
11. Id. See also Goetzl, Recent Arts Legislation-An Overview, Artweek, Jan. 14, 1978, at
15, col. 1. The author of this article reported that in 1978 resale royalties legislation had
been drafted and was under consideration in at least eight other states, including New York,
Ohio, Texas, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, and Rhode Island. For discussion of pro-
posed legislation in Ohio, see Note, Artists' Resale Royalties Legislation: Ohio House Bill
808 and a Proposed Alternative, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 366 (1978). For a description of proposed
legislation in New York, see Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976:
The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 200, 205 (1978). As of November 1980,
no states besides California had enacted such legislation.
12. Mayer is also the National Vice President of Artists Equity Association. Both he and
Peter Alexander were admitted as defendants in intervention because each had royalties
due to him as the result of the resale of his artwork. At the same time the court granted the
San Francisco non-profit corporation, Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts (BALA), leave to par-
ticipate as an amicus curiae. BALA and defendants in intervention filed a joint memoran-
dum on the cross motions for summary judgment. The district court apparently accepted
the entire argument of BALA and the intervening defendants on every issue. See Morseburg
v. Balyon, [1978] 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 518, 518-21 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1978).
13. Phone interview with Richard Mayer, National Vice President of Artists Equity, Nov.
23, 1980. National Resale Royalties Legislation was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives in 1978 by Rep. Waxman (the Visual Arts Act of 1978), to provide royalties on a na-
tional basis for visual artists. See H.R. 11403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 CONG. REc. H 1846
(1978). The major provisions of the draft are discussed in Note, California's Resale Royal-
ties Act, 2 CoM/Ewr L.J. 733, 741 n.48 (1980). In a recent news article, it was noted that
chances are slim for the federal enactment of a Visual Artists Act soon. "[The act] has
remained dormant, and local activists seem to have lost their steam. 'We'll push for it again
after the first of the year,' Mr. Gorewitz, an arts legislation lobbyist said, 'but right now,
there seem more pressing things to deal with.'" Glueck, supra note 10, at col. 6.
The likelihood of more state resale royalties acts will give rise to choice of law problems.
In Morseburg the Ninth Circuit referred to "the possibility of the imposition by the state of
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It is significant, however, that the Morseburg challenge did not
involve the question of preemption of the California law under the
1976 Copyright Revision Act." This article will present an analysis
of the three constitutional arguments advanced by Morseburg, ex-
panding the preemption analysis to encompass the likely outcome
of a challenge to the Resale Royalties Act based on the 1976 Copy-
right Revision Act.
I
Copyright Act Preemption of the Resale Royalties
Act
A. Preemption Generally
The Supreme Court developed the judicial doctrine of federal
preemption" through case law in the context of the sometimes tur-
very high royalty rates and more than one state 'taxing' a single sale." 621 F.2d at 978.
(footnote omitted). The court further illustrated this problem in a footnote: "a seller, who
was a resident of California and who sold the work within the second state [which had
enacted a similar statute] would be confronted with the application of statutes of two
states." Id. at 978 n.3. For a discussion of undesirable consequences in situations where a
second state does not provide for a droit de suite, see Ashley, A Critical Comment on Cali-
fornia's Droit de Suite, Civil Code Section 986, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 249, 259-60 (1977). The
California Act applies to situations where a California resident sells a work of art in another
state. There appears to be no case on point, but cases involving related issues of extraterri-
torial application of state sales tax when the sale has occurred out of state, indicate that
such tax is unconstitutional. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Union Refrigera-
tor Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). However, the royalty can be distinguished
from the sales tax by the fact the tax goes into the state treasury, while the royalty obliga-
tion is owed to the artist creating the work.
A related issue arises when a state legislature seeks to regulate extraterritorial transac-
tions: whether the act in question violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
An analysis of the impact of the Commerce Clause on the Resale Royalties Act is beyond
the scope of this article. However, it should be noted that this issue was left unresolved by
the Morseburg case, since all transactions occurred within California. It is likely to be an
issue in future legal challenges.
14. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (Supp. III 1979). Since Morseburg stipulated that he sold the
paintings that gave rise to the royalty obligation in 1977, before the effective date of the
1976 Copyright Revision Act, neither the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit reached the
issue of preemption under the New Act. 621 F.2d at 974-75, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 520.
15. The preemption doctrine has been developed by the Supreme Court either in the con-
text of a constitutional prohibition on state intrusion into an area of federal legislation (see,
e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)), or in the context of the federal govern-
ment's power to preclude state legislation in a particular area. (See, e.g., Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940).)
The preemption doctrine was developed primarily, at least until recent times, through
cases arising under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3. For a brief history of
the development of the preemption doctrine prior to 1933, see Engdahl, Preemptive Capa-
bility of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLo. L. Ray. 51, 52-54 (1973).
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bulent historical evolution of federal-state relations." As an ana-
lytical tool to aid in allocating power between federal and state
governments the preemption doctrine has often been said to be
based upon the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 7 Preemp-
tion cases often pose unique federal policy questions, and the
Court has tended to take an ad hoc approach to statutory interpre-
tation." The lack of a uniform approach and the resulting ten-
dency to define the doctrine along the lines of the current prevail-
ing views of federal-state relations have been acknowledged by the
Court:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of
treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use
of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying
the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency;
violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expres-
sions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive con-
stitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one
crystal clear distinctly marked formula.1'
In the Morseburg case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nar-
rowed the preemption analysis to the two "basic doctrinal notions
repeatedly . . . used in applying preemption."2 0 In the first, "occu-
pation of the field," the court must determine whether Congress, in
enacting the federal law, intended to occupy the field and thereby
preclude state legislation in the area. In the second, the "conflict"
analysis, the court must ascertain whether .or not the state law
One author, theorizing that preemption implies the existence of federal legislation, limits
his preemption analysis to the invalidation of state legislation under the Supremacy Clause
(U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2) on the grounds of incompatability with a federal regulatory
scheme. Excluded from this definition is the invalidation of a state law purely under a
clause in the Constitution (e.g., cases arising under the Commerce Clause). See Note, The
Preemption Doctrine, Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624 n.7 (1975)(hereinafter cited as Shifting Perspectives).
16. See Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DE PAUL L.
REV. 630 (1972), in which the author notes that James Madison believed the issue of the
proper ordering of state relations to be one of the thorniest problems confronting the draft-
ers at the Constitutional Convention. Id. at 630 n.5.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Comment, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of
Federal Preemption, 22 J. Pus. L. 391, 394 (1973); the author points out that, strictly
speaking, the Supremacy Clause is not concerned with statutory preclusion of state power
rendering state laws which fall within a preempted field invalid. Rather, the Supremacy
Clause resolves conflicts between concurrent powers of the state and federal governments.
Id. at 395-96.
18. See Shifting Perspectives, supra note 15, at 638-39.
19. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940).
20. 621 F.2d at 976. The court's analysis of preemption here closely follows the view
presented in Shifting Perspectives, supra note 15.
No. 1] 5
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stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."
B. Copyright Preemption Under the 1909 Act.
The cause of action in Morseburg v. Balyon arose before the ef-
fective date of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. Consequently, the
Federal District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals an-
alyzed only the preemptive effect of the 1909 Copyright Act upon
the California Resale Royalties Act.'2 In weighing the need for uni-
form national laws against the principles of federalism and states'
interests in cases involving copyright and patent protection, the
Supreme Court emphasized national uniformity" until its 1973 de-
cision in Goldstein v. California. In the companion cases of
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co." and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc." the Court had formerly set forth the preemp-
tion doctrine applicable to patent and copyright,'7 holding that
congressional power over patent and copyright was exclusive and
preemptive of state protection in those areas.'"
In Goldstein, the Court shifted its emphasis in the copyright
21. 621 F.2d at 976: The court "can require no more than a mechanical demonstration of
potential conflict between federal and state law to no less than a showing of substantial
frustration of an important purpose of the federal law by the challenged state law."
22. Id. at 975.
23. See Shifting Perspectives, supra note 15, at 630-39.
24. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
25. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
26. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
27. The Sears-Compco doctrine set forth the preemption doctrine applicable to patents
and copyrights. Both the Sears and the Compco cases involved patented design lighting
fixtures which had been imitated by competitors. The Court ruled only on whether the
plaintiff could base his claim on a state unfair competition law that offered protection simi-
lar to federal patent law. The Court found expressed in the detailed requirements and stan-
dards for patent protection, a congressional concern for striking a balance between those
matters deserving of protection and those that should remain free. In this the court found a
congressional intent that articles not meeting those standards should be left unprotected
and available for public use. 376 U.S. at 231-32. The Court further held the patent area and
the copyright area required uniform national regulation and Congress' power in the area was
exclusive. Id. at 231 n.7. While the cases of Sears and Compco involved patent law, the
Court concluded, "that when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article." Id. at 237.
28. Id. It should be noted that under the 1909 Copyright Act there is a tacit congressional
assumption that states retain concurrent power to afford some forms of copyright protection
since a substantial proportion of all unpublished work was excluded from federal copyright
protection. However, state laws enacted pursuant to this concurrent power were subject to
preemption by the federal copyright statute. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 1.01 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
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realm to advancement of the imperatives of federalism and state
interests.2 9 It established the principle that state legislation similar
to federal copyright protection does not necessarily conflict with
federal law objectives."0 The Court rejected both the theory that
congressional power in the copyright area is exclusive," and the
presumption that Congress intended to completely occupy that
area. 2 A year later, the Court reached a similar conclusion regard-
ing patent in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.," holding that pat-
ent protection afforded by states does not necessarily conflict with
federal objectives and policy.34 This further limited the application
of the Sears-Compco doctrine." Now the Court applies a test
which requires an analysis of the objectives of both federal copy-
right and patent law to determine whether the state law conflicts
with or interferes with federal objectives."
In the Morseburg decision, the Ninth Circuit viewed the Gold-
stein case as controlling in its preemption analysis of the Resale
Royalties Act. 7 Specifically, it discussed the Supreme Court's
holding in Goldstein that when Congress evidenced no intent, ei-
ther expressly or impliedly, to preclude the states from providing
protection in the area of pirated recordings, the area was not fully
occupied by the federal government." In Goldstein the state law at
issue governed a subject (pirated recordings) not covered by the
Copyright Act of 1909,89 and in a manner which "did not disturb a
29. 412 U.S. at 560. See also Shifting Perspectives, supra note 15, at 639-42.
30. 412 U.S. at 570.
31. Id. at 560.
32. Id. at 567-69.
33. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). The Court reversed the court of appeals decision that the Ohio
Trade Secret Law was in conflict with federal patent law.
34. Id. The Court based its conclusion in part on the rationale that the national diversity
of interest negated the exclusiveness of Congress' power in the patent realm, as the Court
had found in the copyright realm in Goldstein. Id. at 479. The Court also found that the
state law in question (a trade secret law), enhanced rather than frustrated the policies and
objectives of patent law, and held the law was not preempted. Id. at 493.
35. Id. at 479-80. It should be noted that in Jacobs v. Robitaille, 406 F. Supp. 1145, 1152-
53 (D.N.H. 1976), the court held that the Goldstein and Kewanee decisions did not overrule
the Sears-Compco doctrine with respect to state attempts to protect works which had fallen
into the public domain.
36. See Comment, The Resale Royalties Act: Paintings, Preemption and Profit, 8
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 239, 249-53 (1978).
37. 621 F.2d at 977.
38. 412 U.S. at 567-70.
39. Id. at 567-71 The Court reasoned that in areas where copyright protection was with-
held, those areas were not felt by Congress to warrant federal protection. Hence, silence by
Congress in the area of regulation of pirated recordings did not imply a congressional intent
to preempt state protection of that item. Id.
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careful balance struck by Congress between those matters deserv-
ing of protection and those things that should remain free,"4 the
Court observed. The court concluded that no conflict existed be-
tween federal and state law.41
Morseburg had argued that the Goldstein rule applied only to
federal preemption of state law grants of rights in works not pro-
tected by the Copyright Act.42 Thus he contended that Sears'3 and
Compco" should remain intact, a viable preemption doctrine with
respect to state law grants of rights within a protected copyright
category. 5 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Morseburg stating:
The teaching of Goldstein is not limited to situations in which
the matter regulated by state law is not covered by the 1909 Act.
Kewanee makes this clear. The crucial inquiry is not whether
state law reaches matters also subject to federal regulation, but
whether the two laws function harmoniously rather than
discordantly.46
Morseburg argued that the California law conflicted with the
federal policy set forth in the "first sale doctrine,"' and thus with
the objective of the Copyright Act, by restricting the artist's ability
to "vend" his or her artwork." The court noted that the right to
vend both attaches and terminates with the initial sale of the copy-
40. 621 F.2d at 977.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
44. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
45. This argument maintains that once it is determined that the state law granted rights
are within a protected copyright category, the state law must be preempted under the
Sears-Compco doctrine.
46. 621 F.2d at 978.
47. The "first sale doctrine" permits uninhibited resale of a work of art following its ini-
tial sale. See 2 NIMMER § 8.12[B] (1980). It is based on the "vending right" in sec. 1 of the
1909 Copyright Act, and sec. 41, which states, "nothing in this title shall be deemed to
forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of
which has been lawfully obtained." Ch. 320, § 27, 35 Stat. 1082 (1909). Nimmer, the author
of the copyright arguments set forth in Morseburg's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, contends
that the Resale Royalties Act clashes with the policy underlying the first sale doctrine, since
it inhibits the resale of the art work by imposition of the royalty obligation. NIMMER §
8.22[B] at pp. 8-272.5-8-272.6. There is some question whether Nimmer's analysis of the
first sale doctrine is supported by case law. See American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman,
400 F. Supp. 928, 933 (S.D. Ala. 1975) in which the court states, "[t]he exclusive right to
vend is limited to the first sale of any one copy and exerts no restriction on the future sale
of that particular copy."
48. For further discussion of the first sale doctrine and its applicability under the 1976
Copyright Revision Act, see text accompanying notes 84-92, infra.
8 [Vol. 3
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righted work,"' while the resale right becomes effective only upon
resale of the art work and not upon the initial sale.50 The court
characterized the royalty right as "an additional right similar to
the additional protection afforded by California's anti-pirating
statute upheld in Goldstein,""' and said it created "a right in per-
sonam against a seller of a 'work of fine art.' ""
The court rejected Morseburg's contention that the law "re-
strict[ed]"" transfer of a copyrighted work of art by one who law-
fully obtained it." The court did not view the obligation to pay the
royalty as a restriction upon the right to vend.55
The court observed that the 1909 Copyright Act did not provide
for a resale royalty and concluded that Congress, in enacting it,
had expressed no hostility towards such a royalty, and did not in-
tend to occupy the field." Further, the court held the Resale Roy-
alties Act did not impermissibly restrict resales by holders of copy-
righted works of fine art, 7 and did not conflict with the 1909
Copyright Act's objectives." The two laws were thus found to
function "harmoniously.""
C. Preemption under the 1976 Copyright Revision Act
The Ninth Circuit confined its preemption analysis to the 1909
Act, but future challenges to the Resale Royalties Act will very
likely arise under the 1976 Copyright Revision Act.eo Courts will




53. Id. at 977-78. "Restriction" here refers to section 27 of the Copyright Act. See note 47,
supra. Morseburg claimed the California Act restricted the transfer of a copyrighted art
work when in the hands of one who lawfully obtained it, such as a purchaser, from the
artist. Id. at 975.
54. Id.
55. Id.




60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (Supp. III 1979). The district court opinion stated, 201 U.S.P.Q.
at 520:
Since the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, by its very terms (sec. 301 (b)(2)), does
not affect "any cause of action arising from the undertakings commenced before
January 1, 1978," the court need not reach its impact here. However, the court
does note that it was not persuaded by plaintiff that the Revision Act of 1976
preempts the Resale Royalties Act. In fact, it appears that the Resale Royalties
Act is not preempted by the Revision Act of 1976.
No. 1] 9
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then address the preemption issue in light of new section 301 of
the Copyright Act which specifically sets forth the standard for de-
termining when the 1976 Act preempts state legislation."
Section 301 provides a two-pronged preemption test. First, the
subject matter of the state legislation must be eligible for copyright
protection under a category of works listed in sections 102 and 103
of the Act." Second, the rights created by state law must be
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by section 106."" If both prongs of the
test are satisfied a court must find that federal copyright law
preempts the state law.6 4
The California Resale Royalties Act applies to any work of "fine
art," which the Act defines as "an original painting, sculpture or
drawing.""' At first glance this appears to fall within the section
102 category of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works."" It
should be noted, however, that the term "work" is not used in the
same way in the two statutes. The sort of work that is the subject
of copyright is one which is "fixed in [a] tangible medium of ex-
pression . . . from which it can be perceived . . . . "7 Conse-
quently, "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," under subsec-
tion 5, are those which may be fixed in paintings, drawings and
sculptures, but they are not the same thing as these latter tangible
objects." The "works of fine art"" which are the subject matter of
the Resale Royalties Act, on the other hand, are tangible objects,
and fall within the definition of "copies" under section 101 of the
61. Sec. 301(a) provides, in part:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . .
are governed exclusively by this title. . . . [No person is entitled to any such




65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(2) (Deering Supp. 1981).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works include two-dimen-
sional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic and applied art. . 17 U.S.C. § 101.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., lst Sess. (1976) explains at p. 53 that "[t]he defini-
tions of ['Copies' and 'phonorecords'] in section 101, together with their usage in section 102
and throughout the bill, reflect a fundamental distinction between the "original work"
which is the product of "authorship" and the multitude of material objects in which it can
be embodied. Thus, in the sense of the bill, a book [or painting, sculpture or drawing] is not
a work of authorship, but is a particular kind of "copy."
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a). See subsection (1)(2), note 3, supra.
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Copyright Act, rather than "original works of authorship" under
section 102.
The subject matter of copyright, under section 102, subsists in
original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium which
would include paintings, drawings and sculptures. Therefore, the
subject matter of the Resale Royalties Act comes within section
102 of the Copyright Act. This distinction between uses of the
term "works," though not controlling in the analysis of preemption
under section 301(b)(1), is important to the question of "equiva-
lence" under section 301(a)(3)."
The right to "distribute copies . . . by sale or other transfer of
ownership," 7 is the only exclusive right provided by section 106
that is similar to the resale royalties right.72 The determination of
the proper meaning and application of "equivalence" requires an
analysis of congressional intent.73
70. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) exempts rights under state statutes with respect to "activities
violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106" from preemption under
federal copyright law.
71. Id. § 106(3).
72. Id. The other exclusive rights guaranteed by copyright under the new Act are (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) to prepare derivative works; (4) to perform the copy-
righted work publicly; (5) to display the copyrighted work publicly.
73. The legislative history, including the Senate (S. REP. No. 97-173), the House (H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476) and the Conference report (H.R. REP. No. 94-1733) contains no mention
of resale royalties. In the Senate version of sec. 301(b) there is included a series of examples
of legal and equitable rights that are not equivalent to copyright: "rights against misappro-
priation . . . breaches of contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of pri-
vacy, false representation." The Senate Report noted that these examples, "while not ex-
haustive, are intended to illustrate rights and remedies that are different in nature from the
rights comprised in copyright and that may continue to be protected under state common
law or statute." S. REP. No. 94-473, at 115. This was originally accepted by the House Com-
mittee and appears in its Report 94-1476 at 132.
Before passage of the bill in the House, an amendment was passed which omitted refer-
ence to the examples altogether. H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1976). The
debate which accompanied passage of the amendment was too confused to provide useful
guidance as to the legislative purpose. See 1 NIMMER § 1.01[B] (1980); Goldstein, Preempted
State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of
Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1117 (1977). Courts have therefore been left to their
own devices to discern a legislative intent behind the removal of the examples. One ap-
proach is to infer that in spite of the open-ended intent indicated by the fact that the
illustrations were not exhaustive, the legislature wanted to insure the area of exempted state
law was wide open:
By deleting the examples . . . Congress must have decided it was better to permit
the states in the first instance through statutory or decisional law to specify or
fashion "rights or remedies" that fall within clause (3), subject, of course, to the
court application of the copyright law limitations of clause (3).
Mitchell v. Penton/Industrial Publishing Company, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 22, 25 (N.D. Ohio
No. 1] 11
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The House Report on the Copyright Revision Act indicates that
1979).
Professor Nimmer points out that section 301(a) of H.R. REP. No. 3447, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966), referred to "all rights in the nature of copyright." The change in the Act to "all
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106" might reflect a desire to limit state created
rights subject to preemption more specifically to those protected under Section 106. 1 Nim-
MER § 1.01[B][1](1980).
See Comment, The Resale Royalties Act: Paintings, Preemption and Profit, supra note
36, at 244, for the argument that 'equivalent' means 'synonymous,' not merely similar or
related to copyright. Id. This interpretation is culled from an analysis of the Senate Report
on the Copyright Act. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1975). In the context of
patents, equivalence has been construed to mean " 'a thing which performs the same func-
tion . . . in substantially the same manner, as the thing of which it is alleged to be an
equivalent.'" Donner v. Sheer Pharmaceutical Corp., 64 F.2d 217, 223 (8th Cir. 1933), citing
WALLER ON PATENTS § 415 (6th ed. 1929). The author of the above article suggests that
because of the vagueness of the equivalency standard the courts might look at the rationale
behind section 301. An analysis of the reasons set forth in the Senate Report, at 113, indi-
cates an intention to eliminate state schemes that are substitutes for federal copyright pro-
tection. Consequently, section 301 should be read to apply to this specific purpose, "rather
than an indefinite broad, preemptive assumption if the overall objectives of the Copyright
Act are to be served." 64 F.2d at 246.
Nimmer, in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, in Morseberg, supra note 8, at 7, contends
that the purpose of section 301(b) is to make clear that preemption does not extend to
matters outside the scope of federal copyright, unless "consistent with the 1964 Supreme
Court decisions in Sears and Compco (citing S. REP. No. 94-473, supra note 73, at 115).
Consequently, he argues, section 301 should be construed by the courts as a broad preemp-
tive mandate (akin to the Sears-Compco doctrine). The Sears and Compco decisions are not
cited in the Senate and House reports in reference to the breadth of the application of
preemption, but rather to clarify that "preemption does not extend to causes of action, or
subject matter outside the scope of the revised Federal copyright statute." H.R. REP. No.
1476, S. REP. No. 94-473, supra note 73, at 115. In Association of American of American
Medical Colleges v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), a nonprofit educational asso-
ciation claimed, among other things, that sections 341 and 342 of Article 7-A of the Educa-
tional Law of New York were preempted by the Copyright Act. The sections imposed cer-
tain obligations on test agencies with regard to disclosure of studies, background reports and
statistical data pertaining to the tests, and the contents of the tests themselves. All that was
before the court was plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. After explaining that
only a brief discussion with regard to the claims was necessary for the present, the court
found that:
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) shows a definite intent to preempt State laws which attempt to
create the same rights as those created by § 106 of the Copyright Act. In Mills
Music, Inc. v. State of Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979), the Court
stated that: "[a]lthough states may provide for additional protections for federal
copyrights, a state may neither abrogate nor in any way diminish the federally
granted and protected rights of a copyright holder." See also Goldstein v. Califor-
nia, [412 U.S. 546 (1973).]
Id. at 1366.
The court was clearly applying the preemption analysis developed in Goldstein and
Kewanee rather than Sears and Compco. See text accompanying notes 25-36, supra.
Whether Congress intentionally ignored the decision in Goldstein and Kewanee which dis-
posed, for the most part, of the Sears-Compco doctrine, is not at all clear. See Note, Copy-
right Law Revision and the Kewanee Preemption Issue: Is There a Doctrine in the House?
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rights "different in nature from the rights comprised in a copyright
. . . may continue to be protected under state common law or stat-
ute."" Commentators are in disagreement as to whether the roy-
alty right is different in nature from the right to distribute guaran-
teed under the Copyright Act.78
Professor Melville B. Nimmer suggests that a right which is
equivalent to copyright under section 301 is one which is infringed
by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or dis-
play. If elements in addition to, or instead of, the above acts are
required to constitute a state created cause of action, then the
right is not equivalent.
This interpretation appears admirably simple, and has been
adopted by a few courts confronted with the issue of preemption
under section 301." However, the application of the rule to certain
common law rights gives improper results. As Professor Nimmer
16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1976).
74. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976).
75. See Comment, The Resale Royalties Act: Paintings, Preemption and Profit, supra
note 36, at 254-55, for an argument against preemption of the Resale Royalties Act under
Section 301. For arguments supporting preemption of the act, see 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.22(B)(1980); Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case of
Droit de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 220 (1978). See also Goldstein, Preempted State
Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses, supra, note 73 at 1115-16.
76. "If under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, no
matter whether the law includes all such acts or only some will in itself infringe the state
created right, then such right is preempted." 1 NIMMER § 1.01[B][1] (1980). This phrasing of
Professor Nimmer's interpretation resembles the following language in the House Report,
with one exception:
The evolving common law of "privacy," "publicity," and trade secrets, and the
general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the
causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a
breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright
infringement.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 73, at 132. That exception is the qualification "different in
nature." This qualification, it is submitted, goes to the heart of the meaning of "equiva-
lence." Qualitative difference, rather than difference in elements, is the consideration of pri-
mary importance:
In assessing whether a cause of action under state law is "equivalent" to a claim
of copyright infringement, the court must compare the rights sought to be pro-
tected under the federal and state laws. The fact that the state cause of action is
composed of fewer elements of proof than a copyright infringement claim is not in
itself dispositive. The state cause of action must protect rights under the facts of a
particular case which are qualitatively different from the rights of reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 501 F. Supp. 848, 852 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
77. See Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Allied
Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, (S.D. Ohio 1980).
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has pointed out,78 states provide rights of publicity and rights
against invasion of privacy and defamation which may be violated
by acts of reproduction, distribution, performance, or display.
These rights are not preempted under section 301.7" Professor
Nimmer accounts for this apparent inconsistency with his interpre-
tation of section 301 by explaining that "the essence of those torts
does not lie in such acts."80
While it is no surprise that a rule should have exceptions, in this
case it would seem that consideration of the "essence" of the rights
involved would be a more appropriate approach to-the meaning of
equivalence under section 301 than comparison of the acts which
violate those rights. The House Report indicates that the meaning
of equivalence is a question of similarity or difference in nature,81
and provides an explanation of the nature of copyright: it pertains
to the literary, musical, graphic, or artistic form in which the au-
thor expressed intellectual concepts. It is submitted that this
description, interpreted in conjunction with other aspects of the
Copyright Act, supports an alternative to Professor Nimmer's ap-
proach which better reflects the intention of the Legislature.
As the above-quoted language makes clear, copyright pertains to
the form in which the author expresses intellectual concepts, in
contrast to the ideas expressed by the work, and in contrast to the
material objects in which the work is embodied." It is the right to
control the reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance and
display of the work. 4 Through this control the copyright owner is
able to exploit the value of his work. The copyright owner can re-
fuse to allow reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance
and display of the work.
The right to resale royalties under California Civil Code Section
986 pertains to "works of fine art."85 A work of fine art is an origi-
nal painting, sculpture, or drawing. It is not a work in the abstract
78. 1 NIMMER § 1.01[B] (1980).
79. Id. § 1.01 [B] at 1-13.
80. Id. Professor Nimmer's reference to "essence" is a substantial change in approach
from the simple formula described earlier.
81. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 73, at 132.
82. Id. at 56-57.
83. The use of the word "form" here seems almost Platonic. The particular form through
which the author expresses the intellectual concept is referred to as the "work." See text
accompanying notes 65-69, supra.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a).
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sense discussed above, but rather a type of material object which
embodies the work expressed. It is a tangible object which derives
its value from the fact that it is unique, that it is the original,
rather than from the value of the copyrightable work it embodies."
The royalty derived from the resale of fine art is derived from
this value of the original.87 The $1,000 minimum makes it ex-
tremely unlikely that the value reflected in the purchase price of a
sale subject to the resale royalties will be the value of the object as
a copy of the underlying work. In this respect there is a difference
in the nature of the right created by the Resale Royalties Act, and
federal copyright.
The sale of the work of art in itself has no legal effect on the
copyright owner's ability to exploit the copyrightable work embod-
ied in the original work of art."8 The practical effect is so minimal
it could be considered de minimus." Similarly, enforcement of an
artists right to a royalty under the Resale Royalties Act has no
effect on any copyright owner's rights under the Copyright Act.
Nor does it effect the public's access to works in the public do-
main. The rights protected by these laws are different in nature. A
court could conclude that the right to distribute and the right to a
resale royalty are not equivalent under section 301.
Professor Nimmer has advanced the argument that:
From a slightly different perspective, it may be said that the fed-
eral policy contained in the "first sale" doctrine, which permits
uninhibited resale of a work of art following its initial sale, may
not be countered by a contrary state law, even though the state
86. Andy Warhol's One Hundred Cambell's Soup Cans and Marcel Duchamp's
L.H.O.O.Q. (color reproduction of the Mona Lisa altered with penciled-in mustache and
beard) are notorious examples of the difference between the value of an original piece of
artwork as an original by the particular artist, and its value as a copy of the underlying
work.
87. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (b)(2).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 202 provides:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord
in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copy-
righted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does
transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright
convey property rights in any material object.
89. If the artist has sold the original without transferring the copyright, he would presum-
ably either have made the arrangements necessary to make reproductions or derivative
works, or have no interest in doing so.
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law's inhibition is by way of royalty rather than prohibition.90
The "first sale doctrine" is embodied in Section 109(a) of the Cop-
yright Act:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or
any person authorized by such owner is entitled, without the au-
thority of the copyright owner, to sell, or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord. This is not, strictly speak-
ing, one of the exclusive rights specified by section 106, since that
section pertains to the rights of copyright owners, rather than pur-
chasers of copies. Interference with this "purchaser's right," if it
can actually be deemed a right, 1 would not fall within the purview
of section 301(a). Therefore, if the "first sale" doctrine were to pre-
empt the Resale Royalties Act, it would be under the same doc-
trines governing preemption before the enactment of the Copy-
right Act. According to the reasoning of the Morseburg court, it
would not be preempted under those doctrines."
90. 2 NIMMER § 8.22[B] at p. 8-272.6. For a description of the first sale doctrine, see note
47, supra.
91. An argument can be made that the "first sale" doctrine should not be characterized as
a right in the sense of a privilege granted by federal law. As the House Report explains, the
principle of section 109(a) was established by court decisions and section 27 of the 1909 Act.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 73, at 79. In Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339
(1908), one year before the doctrine was first explicitly incorporated into the 1909 Copyright
Act, the Court considered the question whether a copyright statute providing exclusive
rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing and
vending," permitted the copyright owner, after having sold copies of the work, to restrict
subsequent sales of those copies. Id. at 348, 350. The Court noted:
In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright
in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose
a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers,
with whom there is no privity of contract. This conclusion is reached in view of
the language of the statute, read in light of its main purpose to secure the right of
multiplying copies of the work,-a right which is the special creation of the stat-
ute .... To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future
retail sales, by notice that such sales must be at a fixed sum, would give a right
not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by
construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining
the legislative intent in its enactment.
Id. at 350-51. The authority to control subsequent sales was held to be something beyond
the exclusive right to vend. Therefore, it can be argued, the incorporation of the Court's
ruling into section 27 of the 1909 Act was not the affirmative grant of a right to the pur-
chaser, but simply a clarification of the extent of the copyright owner's distribution right.
92. See text accompanying footnotes 20-58, supra.
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II
Retroactive Applications of the Resale Royalties
Act: the Contracts Clause and Due Process
Challenges
Morseburg's action for declaratory relief 3 posited two additional
grounds for the California Act's constitutional infirmity.04 Both
challenges were based upon the retroactive application of the obli-
gation to pay royalties pursuant to contracts executed before the
effective date of the California Act." Both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Resale Royalties Act did not
unconstitutionally impair contracts or violate due process."
A. The Contracts Clause Issue
Until quite recently, there was a general concensus within the
legal community that the contracts clause of the United States
Constitution was virtually a "dead letter." 8 A deemphasis of the
sanctity of private contracts, when they conflict with a law began
with the 1934 Supreme Court decision, Home Building & Loan As-
sociation v. Blaisdell." The Blaisdell court focused on whether the
challenged legislation was "addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken [were] reasonable and appropriate to that end."100
It sustained the use of police power despite some contractual im-
pairment when the legislation satisfied a "means-end" test.101 In
the years following the Blaisdell decision, the courts developed a
general rule of judicial deference to social and economic legislation
directed towards a "legitimate end" and employing reasonable
93. Morseburg v. Balyon, [1978] 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 518 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 23, 1978).
94. Id. at 520.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 521; 621 F.2d at 978.
97. See text accompanying notes 114-17, infro.
98. "Today the clause is of negligible importance, and might well be stricken from the
Constitution. For most practical purposes, in fact, it has been." CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION
AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 105 (13th ed. 1973). Compare CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 140 (14th ed. 1978). See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Con-
tract Clause: III, 57 HARV. L. REV. 852, 890-91 (1944); WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION 258 (1938). See generally Note, The Contracts Clause: The Use of a
Strict Standard of Review for State Legislation that Impairs Private Contracts-Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 28 DE PAuL L. REV. 503 (1979).
99. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). In this leading modern case involving the contracts clause, the
Court sustained the Minnesota Moratorium law under the exercise of the 10th Amendment
police power of the states.




means.10 However, the 1977 Supreme Court decision in United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,10 and its 1978 decision in Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,10 clearly signalled a more strin-
gent standard of judicial review under the long dormant contract
clause.105 This new standard requires courts to examine more care-
fully social and economic legislation that impairs contractual
obligations.10
In its Morseburg decision, the Ninth Circuit scrutinized the Re-
sale Royalties Act in light of both the United States Trust and
Allied decisions.10 7 Initially, the court noted that the impact of the
California Act upon sales subsequent to its enacment raised no
contract clause issue.o'" The court further rejected Morseburg's
characterization of the Act as rewriting his contract with the artist
from whom he acquired the work, by requiring a royalty pay-
ment.109 However, the court did find that:
The inescapable effect of the Act is to burden such a buyer of a
work of fine art with an unbargained-for obligation to pay a roy-
alty to the creator of that work or the Arts Council upon resale.
The buyer's obligation is increased, and such alteration no doubt
requires that the Act be scrutinized under the Contracts
Clause.'1 o
The court then proceeded to apply a two-tier analysis indicated by
the majority in Allied as appropriate for contracts clause issues.11
The first tier requires an analysis of the degree of contractual im-
pairment:11 2 if the impairment is deemed severe, the court pro-
102. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn. of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); City
of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
103. 431 U.S. 1 (1977) The Court found the legislation to violate the contracts clause
where the state was a party to the contract. The state had tried to repeal a covenant in state
issued bonds which required funds to be used to generate revdnue for the Port Authority.
The state sought to free these funds for use in mass transit. The Court held this impairment
of a contract in which the state was a party was a violation of the contracts clause.
104. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
105. See 28 DE PAUL L. REV., supra note 98, at 510.
106. 438 U.S. at 244-45, 245 n.16.
107. 621 F.2d at 949.
108. Id. at 978.
109. Id. at 978-79.
110. Id. at 979.
111. 438 U.S. at 244.
112. Id. at 244-45. While the Court in Allied required a determination of the "severity" of
the state legislation, it did not offer any firm guidelines. It did indicate that a court must
look to whether the legislation is unanticipated and the expectations are consequently se-
verely altered; and the Court indicated scrutiny of retroactive legislation should determine
whether a vital area of the contract is affected. Id. This determination of severity has, by
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ceeds to the second tier, to examine carefully the nature and pur-
pose of the legislation."' Applying this analysis to the Resale
Royalties Act, the Ninth Circuit stated:
If impairment there be, which we are not prepared to concede, it
is not of that magnitude (severe, permanent, irrevocable and ret-
roactive). The obligation of the appellant created by the Califor-
nia Act serves a public purpose and is not severe.""
Morseburg contended in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari that
the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied the Allied test and that it
should have applied the so-called Blaisdell five-factor analysis to
the California Act.115 In Blaisdell, however, the Supreme Court
utilized an emergency standard, and the Allied decision clearly in-
dicated that a lack of emergency, alone, will not result in a court
deeming legislation invalid.11 Further, the Court has never over-
ruled Veix v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan Association,117 which
expressly held that an emergency situation need not exist for a
statute which impaired contractual obligations to be constitu-
tional.118 In the Blaisdell decision itself, the Court was careful to
point out that the five-factor analysis should be used in conjunc-
tion with an assessment of the overall reasonableness of the legisla-
tion, including consideration of circumstances surrounding its
enactment.119
and large, been left up to the discretion of the district and appeals courts. Id.
113. Id. at 242. If the severity is deemed significant, the court must then examine the
nature and purpose of the legislation. The finding of severity does not necessarily make the
legislation unconstitutional, but instead calls for examination of the Act. The Court, relying
on the Blaisdell decision, applied a five-factor test to the legislation to determine its valid-
ity: (1) a legislative declaration of an emergency requiring enactment of the disputed law
has been made; (2) the state law was enacted to protect a basic societal interest and not a
favored group; (3) The relief must be "appropriately tailored to the emergency that it was
designed to meet," id. at 242; (4) the imposed conditions are reasonable; (5) the legislation is
limited to the duration of the emergency. Id. The Court in the Allied decision noted that
the presence of an emergency is not the only situation which will justify legislation, and lack
of emergency will not alone invalidate such legislation. Id. at 243.
114. 621 F.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
115. See note 112, supra, for the Blaisdell five-factor test. It was Morseburg's contention
that the application of the five-factor test was required to determine if legislation was valid
under the contracts clause. This is an incorrect analysis of the Allied decision. Allied calls
for an initial determination of the severity in the first tier of the analysis. Only if "severity"
is established will the court proceed to examine the legislation under the five-factor analysis
of Blaisdell. Id. The application of the five factor test is not absolute, in that the lack of an
emergency will not alone necessarily invalidate the legislation. Id. at 243.
116. Id.
117. 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
118. Id. at 38, 40.
119. 290 U.S. at 425-26.
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The Ninth Circuit, relying on the United States Trust Co. and
Allied decisions, stated that the degree to which the state may im-
pair contractual obligations will vary with the public need for that
impairment.1 20 When the impairment is minor, the court must de-
fer to the state legislature's determination of the public need."'
This is consistent with the standard of review established by the
Allied court,12 2 and the Ninth Circuit, in applying the Allied deci-
sion, correctly found the Resale Royalties Act did not violate the
contracts clause. 2 3
B. The Due Process Issue
In addressing Morseburg's second contention regarding constitu-
tional violation, that the California Act deprived him of a funda-
mental property right without due process of law, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied upon the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co." The Usery Court reaffirmed the
traditional view that economic legislation is presumed constitu-
tional.12 5 Consequently, the Court noted, "The burden is on one
complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legisla-
ture has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." 2 In the case
before it, despite drastic increases in financial liability and the ret-
roactive and permanent effect of the legislation,'2 7 the Usery' Court
deferred to the legislative determination of what was in the public
interest and necessary, and found no due process violation. 28
The Ninth Circuit noted in the Morseburg decision that the Cal-
ifornia Act did not affect fundamental rights.'2 9 As a consequence,
120. 621 F.2d at 979.
121. Id.
122. In the Allied decision, the Court noted that if the severity of the legislation is deter-
mined to be minor, the court must defer to the judgment of the legislature. 438 U.S. at 241.
123. 621 F.2d at 978.
124. 428 U.S. 1 (1976). The court upheld a federal statute against a Fifth Amendment
challenge that the statute retroactively required employers to pay compensation to workers
who contracted black lung disease, although no such compensation was required by the em-
ployer-employee contract. Id. at 6-14.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 15-16.
128. Id. at 19-20.
129. 621 F.2d at 979. The substantive content of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been said to embody a "conception of fundamental justice" which protects
against state violations of personal immunities implicit in the "concept of ordered liberty."
Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1979). The right to vote, the right of
association, the right to access to the courts, and assorted freedoms against state intrusion
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the court indicated it declined to act as a superlegislature "to
judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determina-
tions. . . . "'o The court held that the California Act, modeled
upon a similar French law,"'1 did not lack a rational basis and was
neither arbitrary nor capricious in its provisions or effect." The
court did not 'accept Morseburg's contention that the retroactive
application of the royalty obligation to works already acquired
served no public purpose.138 Morseburg argued that retroactive
royalties would not produce more art and to the extent the Act
gives an unexpected source of income to the artist from previously
created works, it reduces the artist's economic need to create more
works.1 34 Whatever the merits of this argument, in the court's view
Morseburg was unable to meet the burden of demonstrating that
the Act operated in an arbitrary and irrational way."3 " Nor did
Morseburg demonstrate that the retroactive royalty obligation af-
fected a fundamental right.1 " The court viewed the royalty be-
stowed by the state on the artist who sold or parted with his work
previous to the effective date of the Act, as a "benefit conferred
upon him by the state because of its desire to promote artistic en-
deavor generally." 3 7 By propounding the rationale it did, the court
implicitly lent support to two propositions: (1) the state may re-
ward artists who worked and sold their works in the past without
receiving a royalty, and (2) the state may reasonably conclude that
such a reward will encourage those who benefit from it to engage in
further artistic activity. 38
into family life and intimate personal contact, have all been held to be fundamental rights.
Id.
130. Id., quoting from New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1977). (In this case the
Court held there was no violation of equal protection in an ordinance prohibiting push-cart
food vendors from selling food while permitting other vendors located in the French Quarter
of New Orleans to continue plying their trade from push-carts.)
131. See Hauser, "The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Under-
privileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1 (1962); see also, Price,
Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of Droit de Suite, 77 YALE
L.J. 1333 (1968). See generally, Note, California's Resale Royalties Act, 2 COMM/ENT L.J.
733 (1980).
132. 621 F.2d at 979.
133. Id.
134. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 18-19.
135. 621 F.2d at 979.
136. Id. See note 129, supra.
137. Id. at 978.
138. A further public purpose might be found in the Act's retroactive application, when it
is considered that the "artist would be around to provide provenance and authenticity . . .
[aInd because he had more of a stake in the work, he'd be on hand to assist in needed
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Addressing further Morseburg's retroactivity argument, the
Ninth Circuit cited Usery for the proposition that legislation is
susceptible to a due process challenge only when its "retroactive
effects are so wholly unexpected and disruptive that harsh and op-
pressive consequences follow."" The court concluded that the
California Resale Royalties Act, with its retroactive provisions, did
not have that effect upon Morseburg's property rights. 14 0
III
Conclusion
By dismissing Morseburg's petition for Writ of Certiorari, the
Supreme Court left intact the strongly worded decision from the
influential Ninth Circuit,"1  one very supportive of the concept of
resale royalties. It was perhaps predictable that certiorari would be
denied in this case,"' however, and given the important issue the
Morseburg court did not reach, it is reasonable to assume that the
Resale Royalties Act will be challenged again in the coming years.
The largest unresolved question is whether the 1976 Copyright Re-
vision Act calls for preemption of the California Act." In the dis-
restoration." Glueck, Royalties on Art Resales Are Far from Universal, N.Y. Times, Nov.
12, 1980, § C at 25, col. 5.
139. 621 F.2d at 983, quoting Hazelwood, Chronic & Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Wein-
berger, 543 F.2d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 1976); accord, In re U.S. Financial Inc., 594 F.2d 1975
(9th Cir. 1979).
140. 621 F.2d at 980.
141. Proponents of the resale royalty concept and champions of the California Act will
perhaps now turn their attention to the analysis and amendment of the Act's inadequate
enforcement and registration mechanisms. See Solomon & Gill, Federal and State Resale
Royalty Legislation: "What Hath Art Wrought?" 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 322, 348 (1978). Along
these same lines, it has been noted that while the California Act was widely expected to
become the model for similar legislation in other states, it "remains unique and after four
years, apparently honored a great deal in the breach." San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 11,
1980, at 8, col. 1.
142. It might be noted in this regard that the thrust of Morseburg's copyright argument
in the petition for Writ of Certiorari was that the Goldstein decision, which the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on in its copyright analysis, was incorrectly decided. The fact that the Writ was
disposed of without comment in seemingly record time (filed Sept. 15, dismissed Nov. 10),
may indeed have nothing to do with the fact Chief Justice Burger wrote the Goldstein deci-
sion. John Davis, attorney for defendants in intervention Richard Mayer and Peter Alexan-
der, noted that the Morseburg case featured stale issues involving the 1909 Copyright Act.
Further, the odds in any petition for certiorari are slim. This was only compounded by the
fact that this case appealed to both those favoring a more conservative states rights doctrine
and those favoring a liberal policy of governmental support for the arts. Phone Interview
with John Davis, Attorney for Defendants in Intervention and Bay Area Lawyers for the
Arts, November 1, 1980.
143. Morseburg did not reach a commerce clause issue; see supra note 13. Nor did it
reach the issue of preemption of the California Act under the 1976 Copyright Revision Act.
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trict court's decision in the Morseburg case, Judge Takasugi noted
in dicta that though the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 was not in
issue, the Resale Royalties Act was probably not preempted by
it.", It is suggested that courts deciding the issue in the future will
agree with this dictum and conclude, as the district court did, that
the Resale Royalties Act "is the very type of innovative lawmaking
that our federalist system is designed to encourage. The California
Legislature has evidently felt that a need exists to offer further
encouragement to and economic protection of artists. This is a de-
cision which the courts shall not lightly reverse." 45
See note 14, supra.
144. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 520.
145. Id.
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